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The culture of risk management is beginning to grow at the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). Created in response to the attacks of September 2001, the Department 
has as one of its primary missions to protect the nation from terrorism.1 Five years after 
its creation, and through several reorganizations, DHS still struggles to master risk 
management with respect to terrorism. Although DHS realized the need for the 
collaboration of intelligence and security professionals to jointly assess risk at its 
inception,2 it was not until the formation of the Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk 
Analysis Center (HITRAC) that DHS had a truly integrated approach to terrorism risk 
analysis. 
 
Risk, defined in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) as a “measure of 
potential harm that encompasses threat, vulnerability, and consequence,”3 guides the 
DHS infrastructure protection community in its analyses and assessments to better inform 
decision-making. Although the NIPP also includes natural disasters or other incidents in 
its definition of risk,4 this paper will focus on terrorism risk, describing the organizational 
development and convergence of DHS’ intelligence and infrastructure protection areas – 
changes designed to bring forth a cultural change of collaboration. In addition, the paper 
will identify current problems and hurdles with regard to a terrorism risk culture. The 
case study will focus on a successful current threat based approach to risk, the Strategic 
Homeland Infrastructure Risk Assessment (SHIRA). Finally, this paper will propose a 
path forward in leveraging the success of the SHIRA to better meet the needs of terrorism 
risk analysis and assessments that inform strategic planning to enhance the protection and 
preparedness of the nation’s CIKR. 
 
 
Recognizing the Need for a Threat-Based Strategy 
 
CIKR is at the heart of the nation’s economy and way of life. From the Banking and 
Finance Sector to the Food and Agriculture Sector, the 18 CIKR sectors form the 
backbone of the United States.5 The preponderance of CIKR in the United States is 
owned privately, making the federal government’s duties with respect to its protection 
challenging. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) established the need 
                                                
1 DHS website, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/strategicplan/index.shtm, accessed 10 April 2008. 
2 Homeland Security Act 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/bill/, accessed 11 April 2008. 
3 National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Department of Homeland Security, 2006, 105, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/editorial_0827.shtm, accessed 11 April 2008. 
4 Ibid. 
5 The eighteen CIKR sectors are:  Agriculture and Food, Banking and Finance, Chemical, Commercial 
Facilities, Communications, Critical Manufacturing, Dams, Defense Industrial Base, Emergency Services, 
Energy: Electric, Energy: Oil and Gas, Government Facilities, Information Technology, Monuments and 
Icons, Commercial Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste, Postal and Shipping, Public Health and 
Healthcare, Transportation: Aviation, Transportation: Highways, Transportation: Maritime, Transportation: 
Mass Transit, Transportation: Pipelines, Transportation: Rail (Freight), Water: Drinking Water, Water: 
Wastewater. 
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to create roles and responsibilities “for Federal departments and agencies to identify and 
prioritize United States critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from 
terrorist attacks.”6 The NIPP, developed by the Office of Infrastructure Protection, 
outlines the overarching structure to blend together current infrastructure protection 
programs with future requirements under a single program.7 
 
This blending requires a strategic risk analysis that informs the prioritization of federal 
government resources for CIKR protection. Risk, a function of the likelihood of an 
unwanted event and its impact or effects, translates into a function of threat, vulnerability, 
and consequences in terrorism risk analysis; threat and vulnerability constitute the 
likelihood.8 There are many techniques and approaches to the risk calculus; but at the 
core of sound risk analysis are the requirements that it be: objective, transparent, 
repeatable, accurate, and discriminating. Because risk models come in various forms 
(quantitative, semi-quantitative, and qualitative) there are competing ideas for what 
constitutes an effective risk model. Quantitative proponents may argue a strict adherence 
to probability theory; however, in situations where data are sparse – as is with 
intelligence and infrastructure – the precision that quantitative models should deliver is 
artificial. Strategic risk analysis for CIKR dictates a logic-based or semi-quantified 
approach. Using sound logic, fully addressing the core requirements of risk analysis, and 
focusing on the problem should be the tenets for strategic risk analysis.  
 
Threat analysis is an essential factor of strategic planning. Although this appears to be 
self evident, some security analysis models do attempt to assess risk without assessing 
threat. Models that lack a threat component appeal to users who assume that the 
government has a monopoly on threat information and that they have no way of obtaining 
it from the government. The CARVER methodology, one of the best-known examples of 
an analytic tool that does not have a threat component, allows a user to prioritize attack 
scenarios by focusing exclusively on vulnerability and consequence.9 Although there are 
significant challenges in public–private information sharing, this solution—to simply 
ignore threat—is misleading at best and disingenuous at worst. It overstates unlikely 
scenarios, especially attacks where the adversary has a very low capability.10 This can 
cause an organization to overlook scenarios that are much more likely, even though they 
do not produce catastrophic consequences. Security and risk analysis without threat is a 
two-legged stool; because it may lead to illogical conclusions, it may be a poor 
foundation for any serious prioritization of efforts or resources.   
 
Even simplistic threat assessments allow some meaningful differentiation of threat levels. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency guide on risk assessment (FEMA 452), for 
                                                
6 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7.  December 17, 2003, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-5.html, accessed 10 April 2008. 
7 National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 1. 
8 National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 35. 
9 See the Product Surety Center’s primer, “CARVER Plus Shock Method for Food Sector Vulnerability 
Assessments,” 2005. 
10 For an in-depth discussion of the repercussions of ignoring terrorist threat, see Jeremy Shapiro’s 
“Managing Homeland Security,” The Brookings Institution: Washington DC, 2008.  
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/0228terrorism_shapiro_Opp08.aspx, accessed 10 April 2008. 
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example, allows a user to make an estimation of threat based on the complexity of the 
task and the difficulty of obtaining and working with the necessary materials.11 Although 
this has the potential to underestimate the capability of a terrorist group in an attack 
method that they have not demonstrated, it does allow an analyst to review open-source 
information and prioritize the threat accordingly.  
 
This type of model would suffice for an individual organization assembling a risk-based 
strategy for its own security efforts. However, it does not allow a comparison of risk 
levels across organizations, given the potential for differences of opinion in threat levels. 
For equitable comparison, there needs to be a central authority to coordinate and – at a 
minimum – set the assumptions for the threat analysis. For a national-level comparison of 
infrastructure, it falls upon DHS to provide that threat analysis. 
 
For CIKR risk, there are two major communities – the Intelligence Community (IC) and 
the infrastructure protection community – that must collaborate on all aspects of risk to 
produce the most accurate assessments for terrorism risk to critical infrastructure. Similar 
to the military decision-making process where intelligence initiates the planning, and all 
functional areas participate in the entire process, CIKR risk assessments must be 
shepherded by the infrastructure protection community with threat as the initiating 
component. The threat referred to in the NIPP is an intelligence-based estimate on 
terrorism – the unwanted act or event in the risk equation.12 A threat-based strategy, 
however, means that all components of risk (threat, vulnerability, and consequence) 
model are shaped by the focus on terrorism.  According to Jeremy Shapiro of the 
Brookings Institute, “[T]his analysis of the terrorist threat implies several priorities for 
U.S. homeland security—and, conversely, several areas that do not need greater attention 
or spending.”13 A threat-based approach to terrorism risk shapes the decision-making 




Threat, defined for CIKR risk purposes as an intelligence-based estimate of terrorism 
against critical infrastructure, must incorporate the evidence along with the analysis of 
subject matter experts on terrorist capabilities and intentions to attack the United States. 
This estimate must reflect the judgment of the level of government to which the threat 
and risk analyses apply. For example, an intelligence-based estimate for a strategic level 
risk assessment model may not be applicable for an assessment for tactical purposes. 
Although the information sharing at DHS is evolving to a more effective system, 
inclusive of state and local governments as well as federal, the nature of intelligence and 
protection of sources and methods makes the prospects of a strategic level assessment 
fully being applicable at a tactical level unlikely. However, the prospects bode well for 
sharing of knowledge and understanding of the estimates between the levels of 
government. 
                                                
11 Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA 452. Risk Assessment: A How-To Guide to Mitigate 
Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, January 2005, p 1-21. 
12 National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 39. 
13 Shapiro.   
4 
 
Intelligence is not an exact science; therefore, DHS should not try and make it such by 
attempting to force a highly quantified model for the sake of an equation. Rather, one 
must tailor the model to the assessment process and allow review of the data (as 
appropriate and in accordance with classification standards) and analyses behind the 
threat assessment for debate. This transparency will in turn allow alternative analyses and 
assessments to build upon the overall risk analysis. Additionally, the threat methodology 
must represent the community of stakeholders. In developing a threat model that 
incorporates the collective knowledge and data from the IC, along with the security needs 
of the infrastructure protection community, the model must serve as a mechanism to 




In the context of terrorism risk, developing a methodology for vulnerability analysis must 
take into account the potential adversary. Therefore, a design of the vulnerability model 
should incorporate terrorism experts who can provide the insight through the lens of the 
terrorists. Models that do not utilize terrorism expertise in the development have the 
potential to bias the model towards unrealistic expectations that may create unattainable 
standards of invulnerability.14 Risk analyses support the allocation of limited resources; a 
vulnerability model that only considers the judgments of security experts misses the 
vector analysis that terrorism experts can bring. For example, many vulnerability models 
are only developed with experts that look at the problem of how security professionals 
view the vulnerabilities and not how adversaries view the vulnerabilities. Collaboration 
between security experts and terrorism analysts provides the ideal approach to developing 




As defined in the NIPP, a consequence assessment should measure the potential loss in 
four categories:  public health and safety, economic, psychological, and governance 
impacts. 15 The four categories are consistent with the ideology and motivations of the 
terrorist threat – terrorist goals to destroy the U.S. economy, government, and impose 
psychological harm. In practice, however, most methodologies focus on economic and 
loss of life because those aspects are more easily quantified. Quantification of the 
economic losses and loss of life is an important aspect of modeling consequence, but that 
alone diverts focus from the whole which includes public health and safety, 
psychological, and governance impacts. Some methodologies measure economic loss and 
loss of life quantitatively with actual dollar values and relegate the other categories 
spelled out in the NIPP to qualitative assessments that are not integrated, leaving the 
assessment bereft of fundamental elements crucial to support decision-making at the 
national level of government. Therefore, whatever the type of methodology (quantitative, 
semi-quantitative, or qualitative), it must incorporate all categories into its methodology. 
Quantification is not merely using real dollar values; therefore, one would have to 
                                                
14 Shapiro.  
15 National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 103. 
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establish equivalencies or utilities to develop consequence models quantitatively that take 
into account all categories where the measurements do not directly translate into dollar 
values. In this approach, a risk index or levels of severity are appropriate for risk analysis. 
 
Wrapping Our Hands Around Threat 
 
The infrastructure protection community can do all it can to create a collaborative 
environment between all levels of government and the private sector; however, the 
challenges with respect to obtaining threat assessments for risk purposes are uniquely a 
government-to-government function. “To receive better threat information from the U.S. 
government, the critical infrastructure protection community must acknowledge inherent 
limitations of intelligence analysis and then help formulate requests for threat 
information, knowing that no single approach or tool will give a decision-maker the full 
perspective needed to manage risk.”16 DHS is the unique government organization that 
makes this government-to-government interaction a reality. Through DHS, the IC and 
infrastructure protection community can learn each others’ characteristics and develop a 
common understanding of the requirements for a terrorism risk assessment.   
 
 
Case Study – Strategic Homeland Infrastructure Risk Assessment 
 
The Strategic Homeland Infrastructure Risk Assessment (SHIRA) provides a national-
level terrorism risk assessment that offers a snapshot of the highest risk to the nation’s 
critical infrastructure and key resources. The SHIRA utilizes an interagency, DHS-led 
process to analyze and produce assessments of threat, vulnerability, and consequence, 
and combines the data into a single measurement of risk for purposes of comparison. The 
methodology uses a structured method to quantify government and non-government 
expert opinions. Where modeling or quantified assessments already exist, their output can 
be easily captured in the SHIRA framework, which is based on accepted risk analysis 
principles and was designed to be as simple as possible. Text descriptions used by 
government experts to assign numerical values were designed to best match the data 
quality and to minimize double-counting of risk factors. 
 
The SHIRA is a scenario-based model where Sector Specific Agencies (SSAs) that 
represent each CIKR sector applied terrorist attack methods of concern to their individual 
sectors. HITRAC, through coordination with the IC partners, provides a standard set of 
terrorist attack methods and descriptions. The SSAs then apply selected attack methods 
of concern to their sectors and create worst, most-likely scenarios. The IC assesses the 
threat of each attack method to each sector and the SSAs assess the vulnerability and 
consequence for each of their respective scenarios. Where applicable, HITRAC will 
assess vulnerability and consequence through independent outside subject matter experts 
to assist and augment the SSAs in their rankings.   
                                                
16 French, Geoffrey S.  “Intelligence Analysis for Strategic Risk Assessments”.  Critical Infrastructure 
Protection:  Elements of Risk.  Critical Infrastructure Protection Program:  George Mason University 




The relationship between the threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments is 
represented:  
 
Risk = Threat  Vulnerability  Consequence (Equation 1) 
 
The risk is computed based on a standard probabilistic model where a quantification of a 
consequence is weighted in proportion to the probability that it will occur. This is 
expressed: 
 
R = P  C  (Equation 2) 
 
where R is risk, a measure of the concern presented by a threat scenario, P is the 
probability that the threat scenario will occur, and C is the consequence if the threat 
scenario occurred and an attack was successful.  
 
It is important to note that the number of terrorist attacks does not support a statistically 
significant calculation of probability. The SHIRA assesses the severity of threat and 
vulnerability as a proxy for probability. The probability that a threat scenario will occur is 
therefore calculated in terms of the likelihood that an adversary will launch the attack 
described in the attack method (represented by the variable TP, where the subscript is 
used to note probability), and the likelihood that the target of the threat scenario is 
vulnerable to the attack (variable VP). This is expressed: 
 
 P = TP  VP   (Equation 3) 
 
Thus, the risk equation becomes: 
 





DHS works closely with the other members of the IC to identify the appropriate terrorist 
attack methods and then quantify the threat from each. The attack methods used in the 
SHIRA are those where terrorists have demonstrated a capability or where intelligence 
reporting indicates that terrorists are making an effort to acquire the capability. 
 
The SHIRA threat analysis addresses both a terrorist group’s capability and intent to 
attack. To estimate capability, DHS examines both the demonstrated capability and takes 
into account the group’s efforts to acquire or augment that capability. To estimate intent 
to attack, DHS first assesses general terrorist interest in attacking the sectors of 
infrastructure and then examines specific intent to use one of the attack methods against a 
specific sector. These are illustrated in Figure 1 and explained in more detail below. The 
benefit of this approach is that it is relatively simple (compared with other approaches to 
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probabilistic threat), it measures severity of threat in a way that allows expert consensus, 
and the results closely match qualitative threat analysis.  
 
Figure 1:  Components of Threat in the SHIRA Model 
 
Framework for the Analytic Process 
 
The SHIRA approach supports interagency consensus on the analytic conclusions in three 
ways. First, DHS uses defined thresholds to delineate stages of capability and degrees of 
intent. Second, DHS provides ranking guidance to help participating analysts assess 
operational capability (i.e., the means, materials, and expertise to launch the attack 
described in the attack method), operational plans (i.e., a terrorist initiative to which 
personnel or funding has been assigned), and other relevant factors in a consistent 
manner. Third, DHS provides the initial rankings and the intelligence reporting that 
contributed to the analytic judgments. This approach provides transparency into the 




When assessing terrorist capabilities, DHS uses analysis of both historical attacks and 
intelligence reporting for an assessment of near-term risk. The SHIRA defines estimated 
capability as having two components: current capability and effort to acquire the 
capability. Current capability considers historical incidents and knowledge of existing 
capability, whereas effort to acquire evaluates an adversary’s attempts to gain or build 
upon a capability (the maturity of the acquisition process or the degree of effort and 
progress of the acquisition process). For a high-level assessment such as the SHIRA, an 
assessment of the effort to acquire a capability helps account for uncertainty, as well as 
provides a mechanism for allowing for the potential increase in capability within the 
near-term timeframe of the analysis.  
 
Table 1 lists the ranking levels and criteria for the components of estimated capability. 
The criteria for effort to acquire are meant to represent an intermediate step to the next 
level of current capability. (That is, a ranking of 3 in effort to acquire is intermediate 
between level 2 and 3 in current capability.) In this way, the ranking table would be used 




Table 1: Ranking Table for Estimated Capability 
Ranking level 
Component 




No effort to acquire 








recruit experts  
Adversary has 
an organized 

















to develop the 
capability to 
launch an attack 




No evidence of 
existing capability 





















Intent to Attack 
 
As stated above, to estimate intent to attack, DHS first assesses the terrorist group’s 
general interest in attacking a sector of infrastructure and then examines specific intent to 
use one of the attack methods against a specific sector. General sector interest reflects 
the adversaries’ general desire to attack a specific sector, irrespective of attack method. 
As with its approach for estimating capability, DHS defines criteria for separating the 
sectors into tiers. The criteria are meant to be specific enough to make clear distinctions 
between the tiers, but flexible enough to accommodate analytic judgments. The tiers do 
not reflect raw numbers of reports, but rather the meaning of the reports. Table 2 contains 
the definitions for the tiers for general sector interest. 
 
Table 2: Rankings for General Sector Interest 
Ranking Description 
Tier 1 
There is a body of evidence or credible reporting and analysis including multiple threat or threat 
streams originating from numerous sources regarding the intent of the group being evaluated to 
attack the sector in the United States. 
Tier 2 
There is credible reporting and analysis depicting a threat originating from a single source or a 
limited set of sources regarding the intent of the group being evaluated to attack the sector in the 
United States 
Tier 3 
There is reporting depicting threat or threat streams originating from sources of undetermined 
credibility regarding the intent of the group being evaluated to attack the sector in the United 
States. 
Tier 4 There is no known information or analysis concerning a terrorist threat to the sector in the United States. 
 
The ranking of general sector interest is used as the baseline of a terrorist intent to attack 
the sector in ranking scenarios (i.e., the use of a specific attack method against a specific 
sector) where there is no intelligence to identify the intent of a terrorist group to attack. 
Where scenario-specific intelligence is available, DHS assesses specific heightened 
interest, which reflects historical precedent or current intelligence reporting. Although 
foreign attacks provide many of the data with regard to intent, the SHIRA criteria 
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separate those that occur in security environments different from the United States. Table 
3 defines the rankings used for specific heightened interest in a scenario. 
 
Table 3: Rankings for Specific Heightened Interest  
Ranking Description 
A 
Intelligence indicates a heightened interest in using the attack method against the sector in the 
United States or Western Europe (e.g., operational plan or attack, or credible source, multiple 
reports, sustained interest, etc.). 
B 
Intelligence indicates a moderate interest in using the attack method against the sector in the 
United States or Western Europe (e.g., multiple reports from different sources of varying credibility, 
recurring interest, etc.). 
C Intelligence indicates a weak interest in using the attack method against the sector in the United States or Western Europe (e.g., few reports of less than credible sources, anecdotal interest, etc.). 
D 
Any group has had a successful attack, failed attack, or disrupted operational plan to launch an 
attack against the sector outside of the United States or Western Europe using the attack method 
described. 
 
Combining the Estimates 
 
There are two ways of combining the intent and capability levels, depending on the needs 
of the overall risk model. The SHIRA model requires the quantification of the threat to 
support its risk analysis. This approach uses a measurement of severity as a proxy for 
probability, and each capability and intent levels are assigned a value between 0 and 1. 
By using a consistent logic to adjust the intervals between the values, the scale reflects 
analytic judgments of distance between the levels and translates the ordinal rankings into 
a cardinal value. Because the SHIRA model treats the two aspects of threat separately, it 
treats estimated capability and intent to attack as independent probabilities. The threat, 
therefore, is a function of (or the multiplication of) the capability and the intent to attack. 
The product is a value on a scale of 0 to 1.0 and used as the threat ranking in the SHIRA 
equation, treated equally with vulnerability and consequence. For risk models that do not 
allow multiplication or cannot utilize a quantified threat level, the SHIRA threat model 
can combine the two factors with Boolean logic and produce a threat level on a low to 
high scale, as appropriate (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: An illustration of Boolean combination of intent and capability 
levels where red indicates high, orange indicates medium-high, yellow 




The equation for TP is: 
 
TP = (I  Ca)  (Equation 5) 
 
The final number provides an indication of the relative severity of the threat for each 
attack scenario and represents a probability that an attack will occur.   
 
 
SHIRA Vulnerability and Consequence 
 
 
DHS works closely with the infrastructure protection community, through the NIPP 
framework, to obtain data and analytic judgments on vulnerability and consequence.  
SSAs, representing a unique community of interest within infrastructure, provide the 
expert judgments for their respective sector. Each sector utilizes the intelligence-based 
terrorist attack methods to create relevant scenarios for their sector under the guidance of 
worst-most likely; the SSAs apply an attack method to an asset, representative asset, or 
system in their sector that represent the worst-most likely scenario. For each scenario, a 
vulnerability and consequence rankings are determined through the SHIRA model 
framework.  
 
Framework for the Analytic Process 
 
Similar to the process for the threat assessment, the vulnerability and consequence 
assessments follow the steps of defining thresholds and providing ranking guidance.  
DHS works with representatives from the SSAs who determine which attack methods 
pose nationally significant risk in their respective sectors and assess the consequences of 




The SSAs take into account three different aspects of vulnerability: (1) the difficulty in 
identifying the asset and its criticality; (2) the effectiveness of the countermeasures in 
place in preventing the attack from succeeding; and (3) if the countermeasures fail, 
whether the attack will have the desired effect. This last consideration allows the SSAs to 
evaluate the robustness or the degree to which a CI/KR system can resist the attack. In 
many infrastructure systems, individual nodes may be highly vulnerable, but the system 
is still highly resistant to the destruction or disruption of a single node. As with the other 
risk factors, the SHIRA process provides the definitions and guidance for ranking each 







Table 4: Ranking Levels for Vulnerability 
Ranking Level 
Component 





Asset is very 
unlikely to be 
recognized; 
adversary would 
require a highly 





Asset is unlikely to 




or training  
Asset is somewhat 
likely to be 
recognized; an 
adversary would 
require a moderate 
amount of research  




this asset will 
minimal effort.  
Asset is very likely 
to be recognized; 
any adversary 
could easily identify 

























are very unlikely to 
defeat the attack. 
Robustness / 
Resistance 
The asset is very 
likely to resist, 
withstand, or 
contain the 
damage from the 
attack. 
The asset is likely 
to resist, withstand, 
or contain the 
damage from the 
attack 
The asset is 
somewhat likely to 
resist, withstand, or 
contain the 
damage from the 
attack. 
The asset is 
unlikely to resist, 
withstand, or 
contain the 
damage from the 
attack. 
The asset is very 
unlikely to resist, 
withstand, or 
contain the 
damage from the 
attack. 
 
The variable used for the likelihood of vulnerability to an attack method, VP, is based on 
government expert judgments of three factors. 
 
 Recognizability (Rg): The likelihood that the adversary will be able to identify 
and locate the asset and its significance, taking into consideration labeling, 
signage, press, uniqueness, and the adversary’s knowledge. 
 Countermeasure Effectiveness (Ce): The effectiveness of the countermeasures 
protecting the asset, specifically in the areas of denial, detection, and interdiction. 
 Robustness / Resistance (Rs) The asset’s or system’s level of ability to sustain the 
attack without countermeasures, due to inherent resistance, system resistance, and 
independence. 
 
Each component is ranked on a 0 to 4 scale, and each ranking is assigned a value in the 
range of 0 to 1. As with threat, the intervals between the values assigned to each level of 
vulnerability are set to represent analytic judgments of their contributions to an overall 
vulnerability level. These values are multiplied, hence, 
 
VP = Rg  Ce  Rs  (Equation 6) 
 
The final number provides an indication of the relative severity of the vulnerability for 





To assess consequences, SSAs consider loss of life, economic losses, and the 
psychological or behavioral impact of an attack, as described in each attack method, in a 
worst, reasonable case scenario. Ranking tables are then used to standardize responses 
and assign values that range from negligible consequence to catastrophic national 
consequences. 
 
Table 5: Ranking Levels for Consequence 














Loss of Life 
Attack likely to 
produce no 
fatalities 
Attack likely to 
cause less than 
100 fatalities 
Attack likely to 
cause greater than 
100 fatalities 




Attack likely to 




from the attack 
are likely less 
than $100 million 
Estimated costs 
from the attack are 
relatively minor, in 
the range of $100 
million  to $1 billion 
Estimated costs 
from the attack in 
the range of $1 
billion to $10 billion  
Estimated costs 
from the attack 
in the range of 
$10 billion to 
$100 billion  
Estimated costs 
from the attack in 




No major change 
in population 
behavior, or 





minor loss of 
nonessential social 
functions in a 
circumscribed 
geographical area.  
Loss of many 
nonessential social 
functions in a 
circumscribed 





functions for a 
sustained period.  




disregard for official 
instructions; 
widespread looting 
and civil unrest.  
 
The consequence of a potential terrorist act is based on several constituent components: 
loss of life, economic losses, and the psychological impact on the populace, and is 
represented by the variables L, E, and Ps, respectively. The estimates can be based on 
expert opinion, quantitative assessments, if available, or modeling and simulation, if 
applicable. The framework ranks these components from 0 through 4. These component 
values are added for a cumulative total and normalized. The final number provides an 
indication of the relative consequence for each attack scenario.  
 
The consequence rankings are measures of severity in the context of the SHIRA and are 
assessed on a common interval scale, where the assessed severity is equivalent within 
each column and rises linearly from one description to the next in each row. The broad 
range in each severity level is a result of the scope of the SHIRA, a national level 
assessment inclusive of all CIKR sectors. The interval scale also allows for a national 
level risk framework that can incorporate more granular assessments of specific assets 
and systems. The components of consequence follow a logical progression for national 
level consequences horizontally; vertically, the severity levels provide levels of 
equivalency that reflect the current decision-making judgment of the DHS. These 
equivalencies can be modified based upon decision-maker input. 
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To get the total consequence, the SHIRA takes the average of the consequence 
components:17  
 
C = (L + E + P) / 3  (Equation 7) 
 
The SHIRA model normalizes the consequence to a range of 0-100 by multiplying by 25: 
 
C = [(L + E + P) / 3] * 25  (Equation 8) 
 
 
Combining the Components for Risk 
 
To produce the final value for the risk of the scenario, the SHIRA multiplies the value for 
consequence from Equation 8 by the probability that the scenario will occur, which in the 
SHIRA is the product of the threat and vulnerability variables.   
 
In this view, the process of computing the value of risk is equivalent to calculating the 
expected value of a random variable with two possible states – C, the consequence of the 
attack scenario succeeding, and 0, the consequence of the attack scenario not 
succeeding.18  Thus:  
 
R = Prob(attack does not succeed) * 0 + Prob(attack succeeds) * C  (Equation 9) 
 
R = Prob(attack succeeds) * C       (Equation 10)  
 
R = (T * V) * C           (Equation 11) 
  





The SHIRA is a semi-quantitative risk assessment that utilizes tables as guidance for the 
IC and infrastructure protection community representatives to estimate the components of 
threat, vulnerability, and consequence. The success of the SHIRA comes from 
understanding of the requirements for a national CIKR risk assessment coupled with the 
constraints and limitations of processes, products, people, and technology. The threat 
rankings provided by the interagency coordination of the IC are the basis for a DHS 
assessed probability for each ranking. Likewise, the vulnerability rankings provided by 
the Sector Specific Agencies that represent each CIKR sector, are converted to 
probabilities by DHS. Additional enhancements to the threat and vulnerability 
components should focus on the core principles of sound risk analysis. For example, as 
                                                
17 Because we consider severity to increase linearly from one linguistic description of each component to 
the next, averaging is a proper way to obtain a unified measure for consequence severity. 
18 Such a variable is called a Bernoulli random variable and its expected value is  
E[variable] = Prob(State1) * Value(State1) + Prob(State2) * Value(State2). 
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the data become more readily available to DHS, more detailed tables that standardize 
probabilities associated with the tables will produce more repeatable results. The 
consequence estimates are based upon large nationally significant ranges; similarly, 
future enhancements should focus on refining the ranges to allow an easier integration of 
more detailed analysis.   
 
Several terrorist attack scenarios exist that could lead to consequences not captured under 
Loss of Life, Economic Losses, or Psychological Impacts factors. For example, while a 
single attack on a Defense Industrial Base asset could cause health, economic, and 
psychological impacts, the primary consequences may be a hindrance to the military’s 
operational capacity. Consequently, mission disruption should be added as a fourth 
consequence factor that could enable all SSAs to account for the impact of an attack on 
national security and federal operations, public health and safety, and essential public 
services.19 By evaluating these effects, the SHIRA could compile a more complete 
picture of the risk to the nation’s CIKR. 
 
The current scope of the SHIRA focuses the assessment of terrorism risk at the strategic 
level. Although it will remain there, the enhancements and refinements to the model 
should allow for integration with other models more pertinent for operational and tactical 
levels. As risk assessments to specific assets and systems proliferate within the 
infrastructure protection community, DHS should identify and exploit areas of 
integration. Horizontal and vertical integration of risk analysis and data will provide the 
backbone for a shared understanding and communication of risk at all levels. Horizontal 
integration requires information sharing (data, analysis, knowledge) not only within the 
infrastructure protection or intelligence domains, but also throughout all the components 
of DHS. The Science and Technology Directorate, for example, provides DHS access to 
the research capabilities of the nation’s universities through the Centers of Excellence. 
Integration with new research and technology will enable the current practices to reduce 
the constraints and limitations of current models. 
 
 
                                                
19 Although the definitions in the guidance documents seem to focus exclusively on governmental 
functions, the mission areas described go beyond the public sector.  Services such as the “orderly 
functioning of the economy” involve private organizations in the banking and finance sector; the provision 
of drinking water is an essential service, and in many cases utilities are private entities. 
 
The definitions used in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7, the National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan, and the Homeland Security Act have areas of overlap.  To help create a mission disruption–
consequence factor, the SHIRA team simplified the six components into three groups of mission impacts: 
 Federal and National Security Impact includes the first two missions (Ensure National Security, 
Perform Federal Missions) because they both focus on a national scale. 
 Public Health and Safety Impact includes the next two components (Ensure Public Health and 
Safety, Maintain Order) because maintaining order is an integral part of ensuring public health and 
safety. 
 Provide Essential Public Services group the remaining two components (Provide Essential 
Public Services, Ensure Orderly Economy) because the best way to ensure an orderly functioning 





The foundation of threat-based risk analysis in the SHIRA can serve as the bedrock of 
future terrorism risk analysis to critical infrastructure at DHS. As the accessibility to 
critical infrastructure data increases and as the IC becomes more familiar with the 
infrastructure protection community’s needs, the quality of the risk analysis will improve 
with the more granular or more direct data. The “fusion” concept, under which the 
SHIRA is produced, if nurtured and allowed to develop into its full potential, will help 
DHS to fully realize a nascent culture. The SHIRA is a model, methodology, and product 
developed through the interactions of the various communities of interest along the 
common thread of threat-based analysis. Its success serves as a microcosm of homeland 
security: a success based upon the interactions of once disparate entities brought together 
under a single focus. 
 
Information sharing and collaboration are the fulcrums on which terrorism risk analysis 
depend; the communities of interest in both the IC and the infrastructure protection 
community provide a depth and breadth of knowledge that only DHS can harness. DHS 
alone is the organization that can bring together the private and public sectors of the 
infrastructure protection community; DHS alone is the organization that can, through its 
own intelligence organization, bring the IC to the infrastructure protection community; 
and DHS alone is the organization that can synthesize the data and analysis together to 
formulate a terrorism risk assessment for critical infrastructure protection. As DHS grows 
beyond five years, we can assume that information sharing and collaboration will 
increase and improve between all stakeholders. This will lead to more data to analyze; 
more data, however, do not indicate better data and better data do not point to better 
analysis. Greater accessibility to data – both intelligence and critical infrastructure – will 
allow for more rigorous analysis of terrorism risk and finer granularity in the 
assessments. The threat-based terrorism risk analysis being cultivated today through 
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